We analyze the e¤ect of accounting bias on the competition and market structure of an industry. In our model, …rms'interim accounting reports on investment projects may contain bias introduced by the mandatory accounting system. We …nd that this bias strictly decreases …rms'pro…ts when investors do not have an abandonment option, but di¤erent results emerge when we allow the investors to divest in the interim. Speci…cally, a conservative accounting regime may increase the likelihood of projects being discontinued, inducing some …rms to exit from the product market and leaving rivals to capture their market share. A conservative regime can thus soften market competition and result in ex ante higher investment payo¤, higher consumer surplus, and higher total social welfare. Since industries often have common reporting standards, we also identify the degrees of industry-wide accounting bias that maximize the expected investor payo¤s. Finally, we allow for investors to coordinate their divestment decisions when both …rms report unfavorable costs and show an improvement to both …rm pro…ts and consumer surplus.
Introduction
Companies sometimes discontinue a product and exit from a market. In an imperfect product market, one …rm's exit means its market share is taken over by the surviving rivals. For example, when Microsoft discontinued Zune, all its market share in the portable media player market shifted to Apple. It is well established that exit inducement, similar to entry deterrence, can soften competition in a market. In this paper, we demonstrate how mandated accounting conservatism might encourage investors to divest, which would result in …rms exiting a particular industry. Accounting conservatism thus plays the role of a coordination mechanism and leads to less competition. 1 This e¤ect arises primarily through the investors'divestment decisions, which are based on the accounting signals reported for the projects they invest in. The accounting conservatism contained in …nancial reports could lead the investors to abandon the projects, thus softening competition or even completely shutting down the product market. However, excessive divestment need not leave the investors worse o¤. A conservative bias in accounting can result in higher ex ante expected investment payo¤ than under the benchmark of unbiased accounting. Thus …rms competing in an oligopoly and their investors may prefer an accounting regime with a deliberate conservative bias.
We consider two …rms that compete in a Cournot market. Each is owned by an investor and run by a hired manager. The …rms operate under the same accounting regime that, for exogenous reasons, generates project reports with a conservative or aggressive bias. Even though each …rm's managers privately learns the true cost information, he must issue a public report following the requirements of the accounting regime. Investors then decide whether to leave or stay, based on the reported cost information.
As a starting point, we examine the case where the investors have no interim abandonment option. We show that, relative to unbiased accounting, a …rm's pro…t is strictly lower under both conservatively and aggressively biased accounting. We also show that the pro…tability decreases with the degree of conservatism or aggressiveness. In addition, we …nd the consumer surplus is strictly higher and the total social welfare is strictly lower under both biased regimes.
In contrast, when investors can divest in the interim, mandated conservative accounting leads to excessive divestment. After the divestment of one …rm, its rival becomes the monopolist of the market. The rival can then earn a higher pro…t due to the change in the market structure. We show that …rms are ex ante better o¤ with conservative accounting, when the potential gain in pro…ts due to the change in market structure outweighs the potential loss due to excessive divestment. Furthermore, we show that consumer surplus and total social welfare could be higher under a conservative regime. Under an aggressive regime, however, …rms may divest less frequently, leading to intensi…ed competition in the product market. The e¤ects of aggressive bias on …rm pro…t and consumer surplus in our model are ambiguous.
Next, we examine whether a degree of industry-wide mandatory accounting bias exists that maximizes the …rms'expected pro…ts. Every industry has its own reporting norms. These norms can be explicitly lobbied for and formalized into accounting rules, or they can be implicitly coordinated by industry participants in their reporting practices. We …nd interior solutions of a pro…t-maximizing degree of bias for both conservative and aggressive regimes.
Last, we explore the case where both …rms report bad costs. If one of the investors chooses not to abandon her project while the other investor does, the …rst …rm becomes a monopolist. A monopolist with unfavorable costs may still generate a pro…t that is higher than its assets' liquidation value. We allow for a solution with correlated equilibrium, through which the …rms can coordinate on a public signal for their divestment decisions. This coordination leaves not only the investors better o¤ but also the consumer surplus higher, since the product market survives with at least one monopolist.
Our results depend on two critical assumptions. First, investors must have an interim abandonment option. Firm assets may depreciate over time but must maintain a positive interim value. The investors choose to divest only if future investment payo¤s are lower than the assets'interim value. This value could partially proxy for the exit barrier faced by …rms competing in the industry. A higher value of the liquidated assets indicates a lower exit barrier. Second, the interim report about the …rm's future investment payo¤ can only be generated by a mandated accounting system, and the managers have no other channel to communicate with the investors about future pro…t.
Our paper closely relates to prior studies on the impact of potential entry on the incumbent's disclosure behavior, when the incumbent has private information. 2 To scare o¤ entrants, a monopolist with private …rm-speci…c information could adopt a limit pricing strategy (charging a price below monopoly-price level) or aggressive advertising to signal its superior costs Harrington, 1986; Srinivasan, 1991; Bagwell, 2007; etc.) . On the other hand, when the private information concerns a market-wide factor, the incumbent will prefer to deter entry by reporting bad news to indicate a lack of prospects. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) examine how the threat of entry may a¤ect a …rm's incentive to disclose information about the product market. They show that the incumbent prefers full disclosure only when projections about the market are optimistic or the entry barrier is low. Guo (2012) examines the e¤ect of conservatism in an oligopoly and …nds that it could bene…t …rms when there is no entry threat but that the opposite is true when faced with a potential entrant.
The …rms in our model possess …rm-speci…c private information. However, they prefer to report a downwardly biased signal to promote exit, including their own potential exit, from the product market. This di¤ers from the entry deterrence strategies used in prior studies. While …rms prefer to report good …rm-speci…c news in an entry deterrence game, …rms in our model prefer to report bad …rm-speci…c news. They also face a trade-o¤ quite di¤erent from the …rms in prior studies. The incumbent in Darrough and Stoughton (1990) , for example, faces a trade-o¤ between disclosing good information to improve its stock price and not disclosing to deter entry. Our …rms' decision involves weighing the bene…t of becoming the surviving monopolist against the cost of shutting down.
Our paper also relates to studies of the interaction of accounting disclosure and product market competition without entry and exit. Darrough (1993) examines the reporting of …rms with private information when engaged in Cournot or Bertrand competition. She …nds that …rms in a Cournot market with substitutable products prefer full disclosure and that reporting bias reduces their expected pro…ts. Our analysis for the case where there is no interim abandonment option con…rms her results. Wagenhofer (1990) studies a …rm's optimal voluntary disclosure strategy when facing a rival and …nds that these disclosures may increase the …rm's product price while simultaneously imposing a proprietary cost. Reis and Stocken (2007) contrast the informativeness of historical costing and fair value measurement in a strategic setting. Bagnoli and Watts (2010) examine how two …rms bias their accounting reports when competing in a Cournot product market and the e¤ect of accounting bias on the …rms' production decision. Corona and Nan (2013) …nd that …rms competing with each other strategically over-report their planned future activities in pre-announcements. Finally, Friedman et al. (2016) examine the e¤ect of conservatism on …rm and industry pro…ts and …nd that industry pro…ts increase/decrease when the reported information is …rm-speci…c/industry-wide. None of these studies involves a change in market structure through entry or exit.
Another stream of literature our paper relates to looks at accounting conservatism and debt. 3 Prior studies examine the e¤ect of conservatism on debt covenants. Venugopalan (2009) and Gigler et al. (2009) show that conservatism does not improve debt-contracting e¢ ciency. Li (2013) demonstrates that conservatism may increase the borrower's pro…ts when renegotiation is allowed. Caskey and Hughes (2012) , in contrast, show that debt covenants based on conservative measures outperform those based on fair value measures in deterring asset substitution. Several other studies focus on the e¤ect of conservatism on collateral. Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) …nd conservatism is optimal in the reporting of collateral value, especially in the case of asset impairment. Cheynel and Michaeli (2012) study optimal accounting measurement of assets in an n-…rm economy. Their …rms can provide and receive …nancing from each other. Using a general equilibrium approach, they characterize how the optimal accounting policy and cost of capital depend on the economic environment. With the exception of Cheynel and Michaeli (2012) , all of these studies focus on a single-…rm setting.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we show biased accounting can soften product market competition and induce changes in market structure; accounting regulation and practice can have real e¤ects. Second, we show that conservatism need not decrease the expected pro…ts of an industry or …rms. Prior analytical studies demonstrate a negative e¤ect on debt e¢ ciency absent market competition. Our results, in contrast, show that investors may prefer conservatism in the presence of imperfect product market competition. In fact, conservatism could even lead to a higher total social welfare under certain conditions. Third, we examine a competition-softening mechanism that has not been studied. Firm exit through interim abandonment under conservative accounting di¤ers from the strategies used by …rms in prior research to deter entry. In fact, Watts (2003) argues that an abandonment option is necessary to create demand for conservatism in an equity setting. 4 Our results could help explain the market structures of industries that have low entry threat, perhaps due to high entry barriers, but varied exit strategies.
Our results have empirical implications, especially related to inter-industry variation of accounting conservatism. We predict that industries with more conservative accounting will, ceteris paribus, have a higher return on investment and lower cost of equity. An event study could empirically test our predictions. For example, when all …rms in an industry face a mandated increase in conservatism, we predict that the total production quantity and cost of capital will decrease, while product price and return on investment will increase. A key control variable for these tests is the proxy for exit barrier-the market value for liquidated assets. When an industry requires highly customized technology and equipment, its assets are likely to have low market value once liquidated. Thus we predict liquidation value to be positively associated with all major dependent variables. 4 Empirical evidence also supports the use of accounting information in shareholders'abandonment decisions. Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) show that shareholders use balance sheet information to determine their abandonment option value, which is then integrated into the stock price. Hayn (1995) …nds that the income statement information also re ‡ects shareholders'consideration for abandonment option. Speci…cally, she shows that di¤erent qualities of pro…ts and losses are primarily due to this abandonment option. Since the shareholders can choose to divest, should the …rm values drop below certain thresholds, losses do not perpetuate and therefore have a lower earnings response coe¢ cient.
The Model
We consider a setting with two …rms, i and j; each owned by an investor and run by a hired manager. Each …rm has invested cash I in a project to produce and sell a new product to the consumer. Without losing generality, we assume the products produced by the two …rms are identical and perfectly substitutable. In each …rm, the investor approves the investment project, but the manager is responsible for the …rm's operations including reporting and production.
Firm i's manager privately observes the true realized costs of his …rm's product. However, he cannot communicate the cost information to his investor except through public accounting reports, which may be subject to bias imposed by the accounting regime. Upon receiving the reports, …rm i's investor decides whether to continue to invest or divest. If the investor decides to continue, the manager chooses a production quantity to maximize the expected …rm pro…t. To keep the model parsimonious, the managers in our model do not create cost, nor do they add value to the …rms' production. They merely observe the true costs and report them to the investors through accounting signals. We then examine the interaction between these two …rms and their investors.
Following Vives (1984) , the representative consumer's utility from the two products is
where P is the unit price for the product; a is the intercept of market demand; and Q i and Q j are the quantities produced and sold by …rm i and j, respectively. Solving the representative consumer's problem by taking the …rst-order conditions with regard to Q i and Q j , we derive the inverse demand function for the product:
where c b denotes unfavorable cost and c g denotes favorable cost. We denote the probability of a …rm having a low marginal cost as = Pr fC i = c g g and the probability of the …rm having a high marginal cost as 1 = Pr fC i = c b g. The marginal costs of the two …rms are independent. Firm i's pro…t from the investment project is i = Q i (P C i ).
We model the …rms'accounting environment through two variables, 2 [0; 1] and 2 [0; 1], that represent the …rms' reporting requirements. First, nature determines whether …rm i's true cost is c g or c b . A report is then produced by an exogenously determined accounting regime. There are three di¤erent accounting regimes: unbiased, conservative, and aggressive. An unbiased regime generates a truthful cost report with probability one. A conservative regime is de…ned as generating an upwardly biased cost report. Speci…cally, it generates an unfavorable cost report with probability one when the true cost is unfavorable but generates a favorable cost report with probability (and an unfavorable cost report with probability 1 ) when the true cost is favorable. 5 An aggressive regime is the opposite of the conservative regime, generating a favorable cost report with probability one when the true cost is favorable, and a favorable cost report with probability (and an unfavorable cost report with probability 1 ) when the true cost is unfavorable. The degree of conservatism is thus 1 under a conservative regime, and the degree of aggressiveness is under an aggressive regime. For ease of presentation, we denote the posterior probabilities of true cost being consistent with the report as P r [c g jĉ g ] = and P r [c b jĉ b ] = : Speci…cally, under an unbiased regime, and are both 1; under a conservative regime, is 1 and is
; under an aggressive regime, = +( (1 ) ) and is 1. Upon privately observing his own …rm's project cost, …rm i's manager discloses the cost report b C i 2 fb c g ; b c b g generated by the …rm's accounting system. The cost report is observed by everyone in the economy, including the …rm j's competitor and the two investors. The report may contain an accounting bias. When both …rms' managers simultaneously decide their …rms' output quantities, …rm i's manager maximizes his …rm's expected pro…t, conditional on (i) the realized value of its own true cost C i , (ii) its own cost report b C i , and (iii) its competitor's cost report b C j . That is, the expected pro…t for …rm i from the investment project is
Obviously, …rm i's pro…t from Cournot competition varies under the di¤erent accounting regimes. With perfect/unbiased accounting information, we know C i = b C i is always true. We thus denote a …rm's pro…t as a function of its own cost and the competitor's cost. For example, d (c g; c b ) refers to a …rm's expected pro…t from duopolistic competition when its own cost is good and its competitor's cost is bad. With conservative or aggressive accounting information, a …rm's expected pro…t is a function of its own cost, its reported cost, and its competitor's reported cost. For example, we denote d (c g; b c b; b c b ) as the …rm's duopolistic pro…t when its true cost is good, its report is bad, and its competitor's report is bad. For monopolistic pro…t, we use the notation of m (c g ) or m (c b ) ; as the reported cost plays no role here. Figure 1 below summarizes the timeline of events. In time 0, the …rms'investors decide to invest in a project to produce and sell a new product. In time 1, the product costs are realized and the cost reports are generated by the respective …rms'accounting regimes. Based on the reports, the investors decide to continue or divest. In time 3, the …rms compete in the product market and the managers make production quantity decisions. Finally, in time 4, the investors receive their payo¤s. We assume that the structure of the model and its parameters are common knowledge and employ the standard subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept (except in section 4.5 where we discuss correlated equilibrium).
Without Abandonment Option
As a benchmark, we …rst examine the …rms'pro…ts when the investors commit to always continue the investment projects, regardless of the accounting reports. That is, the investors never abandon the projects, and the two …rms always get to compete in a Cournot market. Firm i's expected pro…t is simply the sum of its pro…ts under the three di¤erent accounting regimes weighted by the corresponding probabilities. 7 Under an unbiased accounting regime, the ex ante expected pro…t for …rm i is
Under a conservative regime, the ex ante expected …rm pro…t is
Under an aggressive regime, the ex ante expected …rm pro…t is
Proposition 1. When …rms compete in a Cournot fashion with investors who always choose to let the projects continue, their pro…ts under the conservative or the aggressive accounting regime are strictly lower than that under the unbiased regime, and the pro…ts decrease with the level of conservatism/aggressiveness.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that accounting bias decreases expected …rm pro…t in a Cournot setting. The …rms thus prefer a less biased accounting regime. The reason for the decreased pro…t is the e¢ ciency loss caused by the accounting distortion. For example, there are two scenarios when the …rm pro…t is higher under a conservative accounting system than under an unbiased system:
However, the pro…ts from the other four scenarios are all lower under a conservative accounting system than under an unbiased one. The losses thus outweigh the gains. Note that this result resembles the …nding of Darrough (1993) , who shows that reporting noise about cost information reduces expected …rm pro…ts in Cournot competition. However, our result also di¤ers from that of Darrough (1993) in that the noise in her model is independent of the state, while the bias/noise in our model is state-dependent.
The following …gure demonstrates the e¢ ciency loss due to accounting distortion. We also analyze the e¤ect of accounting bias on consumer surplus and social welfare.
We denote consumer surplus as V , which is:
where P (Q) = a (Q i + Q j ) ; Q i and Q j are the equilibrium production quantities for …rm i and j in Cournot competition and P is the equilibrium price for the product. We denote the total social welfare as W; the sum of …rm pro…t and consumer surplus:
Corollary 2. When …rms compete in a Cournot fashion with investors who always choose to let the …rms continue with operations, the consumer surplus under the conservative or the aggressive accounting system is strictly higher than that under the unbiased accounting system, but the total social welfare under the conservative or the aggressive accounting system is strictly lower than that under the unbiased accounting system.
Corollary 2 shows that the consumer surplus is higher when accounting reports are biased. This is because the expected production quantity under the conservative or the aggressive accounting regime is higher than under the unbiased accounting regime. Higher production quantity then leads to a higher level of consumer surplus. Figure 3 demonstrates the increase of consumer surplus as a function of the accounting conservatism or aggressiveness. However, since the loss in the …rms'pro…ts is greater than the increase in the consumer surplus, the total social welfare is still lower under the conservative or the aggressive accounting system than under the unbiased one. Corollary 2 thus demonstrates that accounting bias hurts the total social welfare when interim abandonment is not allowed.
With Abandonment Option
We now allow the investors the interim option to abandon the projects. We assume the assets employed by the projects depreciate. At time zero, the investor invests cash I to acquire assets. At time two, these assets depreciate to an amount K < I, which is the abandonment value should the investors decide to terminate the project. By time 4, the assets would have depreciated to zero market value. The value of K matters in the investors'termination decision, as it represents the exit barrier of …rms competing in the same industry. 8 We assume K is neither too high nor too low, to ensure that the investors only divest when receiving a bad cost report.
The investors rely on the …rms' cost reports to make their divestment decisions. For …rm i's investor, there are four scenarios of cost reports: 1) both …rms report good costs; 2) …rm i reports good cost, and …rm j reports bad cost; 3) …rm i reports bad cost, and …rm j reports good cost; 4) both …rms report bad costs. We denote the …rm's expected payo¤ as a function of the investor's information set, (b c i ; b c j ). For each of the four scenarios, investor i must compare the expected future project payo¤ with the abandonment value K to determine whether to divest or continue.
Unbiased accounting regime
Under an unbiased accounting regime, both favorable and unfavorable cost realizations are reported truthfully. That is, (b c i ; b c j ) is exactly the same as d (c i; c j ) : Examining the …rms'Cournot pro…ts under an unbiased accounting regime, we know
Thus a …rm whose project has a favorable cost is always going to have higher pro…t than a …rm whose project has an unfavorable cost. Furthermore, the pro…t of a …rm whose project has a favorable/unfavorable cost is always higher/lower than K. The investor i thus always chooses to divest when receiving an unfavorable report. 9 An interesting result emerges when one …rm issues a favorable report and the other issues an unfavorable one. The …rm with an unfavorable report terminates its project, 8 Although we assume the value of K as exogenous, it is often determined by a separate market for liquidated assets. Cheynel and Michaeli (2012) adopt a general equilibrium approach for the valuation of such assets. Shleifer and Vishny (2010), on the other hand, examine a market for assets in which demand and supply are determined by the number of …rms going bankrupt in an industry. The more …rms are bankrupt, the less valuable the liquidated assets and hence the resulting …re sale. 9 Of course, for su¢ ciently high abandonment value K, such as K > m (c g ), both investors would abandon their projects. If K < d (b c b ; b c g ) ; the investors would never divest, and the …rms' pro…ts remain the same as when there is no interim abandonment option. and the remaining …rm becomes a monopolist in that product market and earns a higher pro…t than when both …rms have a favorable cost. That is, m (c g ) > d (c g; c g ) > K. Table 1 presents the …rms'pro…ts from their investment projects: Table 1 . Firm pro…ts under an unbiased accounting regime Firm i's total expected pro…t under an unbiased accounting regime is
Conservative accounting regime
Under a conservative accounting regime, the …rms must report an unfavorable cost when the true cost is unfavorable. But when the true cost is favorable, the …rm may report a favorable cost with probability and report an unfavorable cost with probability 1
. The investors only observe the cost reports from both …rms but do not know the …rms' true costs. Examining …rm i's pro…ts, we know 10 , which implies that the investors divest when they receive a bad project cost report from their respective …rms.
The …rms'pro…ts from the investment projects are summarized in Table 2 . Table 2 . Firm pro…ts under a conservative accounting regime,
When the value of K is higher than d (b c b ; b c b ), investor i always chooses to divest when receiving an unfavorable report. The total expected pro…t for …rm i is
A conservative accounting bias induces two e¤ects in …rm i's expected project payo¤. The …rst e¤ect comes from misclassifying …rm i's cost as bad when it is actually good, which increases the chance of …rm i's project being terminated and decreases its expected pro…t. The second e¤ect comes from misclassifying …rm j's cost as bad when it is actually good, which increases …rm i's pro…t. The di¤erence between …rm i's expected pro…ts under the conservative and unbiased regimes can be written as
misclassify competitor with good cost as bad
misclassify own …rm with good cost as bad : (11) Clearly, a …rm's expected pro…t is higher under the conservative accounting regime than under the unbiased regime, if the e¤ect of misclassifying its competitor's cost as bad outweighs the e¤ect of misclassifying the …rm's own cost as bad when, in fact, it is good.
Proposition 3. When …rms compete in Cournot fashion and have investors who have an interim abandonment option, E [
; and E [ con: ] increases in the degree of conservatism if > 1 2
Without the abandonment option, the investors'payo¤s are strictly lower under the conservative accounting regime than under the unbiased accounting regime. However, Proposition 3 shows that the opposite e¤ect could emerge when interim abandonment is allowed, provided the state of nature, ; is su¢ ciently good, and the degree of conservatism, 1
; is su¢ ciently low. This is because the competition-softening e¤ect of conservatism must outweigh its cost in divestment when the costs are favorable. Speci…cally, the di¤erence between the …rm's duopoly pro…t d (c g ; c g ) and monopoly pro…t m (c g ) must be su¢ ciently large compared to the di¤erence between K and d (c g ; c g ) for conservatism to bene…t the …rm.
The …rm pro…ts also increase in the degree of conservatism imposed by the mandatory accounting system. This result is quite di¤erent from the prior literature, which typically shows conservatism decreases investment e¢ ciency (e.g. Gigler et al., 2009; Li, 2011) . The reason for the di¤erent result in our setting is due to the fact that accounting conservatism can indirectly change the industry structure and soften competition.
Similarly, the expected consumer surplus, V; and expected total social welfare, W , are also a¤ected by the accounting regimes. ; and E [W Proof. See appendix.
Without the interim abandonment option, the consumer surplus strictly increases but …rm pro…ts strictly decrease with the conservative accounting bias. However, with the interim abandonment option, both consumer surplus and …rm pro…ts can be higher under the conservative accounting system. The consumer surplus under the conservative regime is higher than under the unbiased regime as long as the degree of accounting conservatism 1 is not too high. This is largely consistent with the results of Corollary 2, except when the degree of conservatism is too high, which results in a high chance of the projects being terminated. The condition for a higher total social welfare under the conservative system is primarily driven by the investors' payo¤s, rather than consumer surplus. Compared to the conditions in Proposition 1, the total social welfare with interim abandonment may be higher under conservative regime because the investors'payo¤s are higher.
Aggressive accounting regime
Under aggressive accounting regime, a …rm may provide a good cost report even when the true cost is bad with probability . Therefore a …rm with truly bad cost may still be allowed to continue and compete in the product market. Again we know
always holds true, and we assume
The investors thus divest when they receive a bad report from their respective …rms and stay when they receive a good report. The …rm pro…ts are summarized in Table 3 . 
The total expected pro…t for …rm i's investor is 12) and the di¤erence between expected pro…ts under aggressive and unbiased regimes can be written as
misclassify own …rm with bad cost as good
misclassify competitor with bad cost as good
correctly classify both …rms as good : (13) Three e¤ects arise from the aggressive accounting bias in cost reports. When …rm i itself has bad cost but is misclassi…ed as good, it earns a monopolist pro…t when the competitor j's project is terminated but loses the assets' potential liquidation value K when j also survives. When competitor j with bad cost is misclassi…ed as good, …rm i that has true good cost loses its monopoly pro…t. A third di¤erential e¤ect also arises when both …rms with good costs are correctly classi…ed as good. c g ) ; because the rival …rm j that reports a good cost could have a bad cost.
The …rst e¤ect, when …rm i is misclassi…ed as having good cost, is ambiguous on …rm i's investment payo¤. The second e¤ect, when …rm j is misclassi…ed as having good cost, results in a strict reduction in …rm i's pro…t. The third e¤ect, when both …rms are correctly classi…ed as having good costs, results in an increase in …rm i's pro…t. In general, the overall e¤ect of aggressive accounting on the …rm pro…t and consumer surplus is inconclusive.
Optimal level of industry-wide accounting bias
Accounting demonstrates distinct industry characteristics. Many industries, such as the oil and gas industry and the …nancial services industry, have speci…c accounting rules and reporting requirements. Empirical research shows that public accounting …rms also respond to such demand by developing industry specializations (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995, Ferguson and Stokes 2002) . Within a given industry, …rms can therefore coordinate and lobby for a …nancial reporting standard that maximizes their pro…ts. It is thus not surprising that the …rms settle on a commonly agreed level of accounting bias.
When the investors do not have an interim abandonment option, accounting bias leads to strictly lower level of …rm pro…t. That is, the level of industry-wide accounting bias that maximizes the …rms'pro…t is zero. When there is an abandonment option available, however, the optimal levels of accounting bias have interior solutions. 
under the aggressive regime.
We can also easily see that the pro…t-maximizing degree of conservatism increases in both the abandonment value K and the state of nature : On the contrary, the pro…t-maximizing degree of aggressiveness decreases in both K and :
Divestment and Coordination
When both …rms report unfavorable costs, we have shown that the investors choose to divest since d (b c b ; b c b ) < K. However, if we allow the investors to coordinate their abandonment decisions, an improvement could result in the expected …rm pro…ts. Speci…cally, when one of the investors chooses not to terminate her project, while the other investor does, the …rst …rm becomes a monopolist in the speci…c product market. A monopolist with unfavorable cost may still generate a level of pro…t that is higher than the assets'liquidation value. That is, the investor may be better o¤ not to divest all the time if m (c b ) > K.
Using the concept of correlated equilibrium, we let the two investors follow a random public signal to coordinate their actions on divestment. This signal could be the weather, the stock market performance, or anything that both investors could observe publicly. The public signal has two outcomes, fA; Bg, each with a 1 2 probability of occurrence. The two investors agree that investor i divests when A occurs and does not when B occurs, and investor j divests when B occurs and does not divest when A occurs. We can easily verify that such strategies are the best responses for both investors and the investors have no incentive to deviate. ; investor i can follow a strategy to always divest when observing A and not divest when observing B. The resulted pro…t for …rm i is
under the unbiased and the aggressive accounting regimes and
under the conservative accounting regime.
The correlated equilibrium generates a positive improvement in the …rms'pro…ts, because it helps the …rms avoid the undesirable outcome of under the unbiased and the aggressive accounting regimes, and from 0 to
under the conservative accounting regime. This is because, without correlated equilibrium, both …rms would be shut down, and there would be no products sold on the market. When the two …rms are allowed to coordinate through the public signal, at least one …rm will be producing at a time. The correlated equilibrium thus leads to a Pareto improvement for all players when both …rms report bad costs.
Conclusions
We show that accounting bias reduces expected pro…tability when …rms compete in a Cournot product market and investors do not have an interim abandonment option. In contrast, when investors are allowed to divest in the interim, …rm pro…ts can be higher under the conservative accounting regime than under the unbiased regime. This is because the investors rely on interim accounting reports to make their abandonment decisions, and conservative bias in the reports increases the likelihood of divestment and softens competition. In addition, we show that consumer surplus and total social welfare can both be higher under the conservative regime.
We also identify optimal degrees of accounting bias that maximize the expected investment payo¤ under both conservative and aggressive regimes. Since the …rms in a given industry can lobby for the norms of …nancial reporting, they may agree on a degree of accounting bias that is ex ante preferred. Finally, we discuss the possibility of coordinated divestment decisions when both …rms report unfavorable costs and show a Pareto improvement through a correlated equilibrium concept.
This insight of our results can be extended to debt …nancing. When a debt covenant is based on accounting reports, conservative accounting triggers debt covenant violation more frequently. However, similar to the equity setting, the creditors' liquidation decisions can soften product market competition. The surviving …rms get to capture the entire market share and are more likely to generate enough pro…t to pay back the debt. Therefore …rms under conservative accounting regime that borrow can enjoy an ex ante lower cost of debt.
In summary, our study shows how accounting can have a real e¤ect on …rms'operating decisions through the investors'abandonment option. Accounting bias is often perceived to be merely a distortion of information and devoid of any real impact on economic behavior. In our setting, however, accounting bias can change the competitive nature of product markets in which the invested …rms compete.
Our model is subject to several limitations. For example, we analyze a Cournot market with two …rms. As the number of participating …rms in an industry rises, …rm pro…t decreases, and so does the …rms'ex ante incentive to exit and the competitionsoftening e¤ect of accounting conservatism. Also, we only model identical …rms. If the participating …rms are heterogeneous, it may become more di¢ cult for them to agree on a common conservative accounting system that coordinates exit. However, none of these scenarios should change our result qualitatively.
Under the unbiased accounting regime, the reported costs are the same as the realized costs. There are thus four di¤erent scenarios of information structure, resulting in four di¤erent levels of production quantity and …rm pro…t. Under the conservative and the aggressive accounting regimes, the reported costs and the realized costs may not be the same. Under the conservative accounting regime, a …rm may have favorable realized cost but unfavorable reported cost. Under the aggressive accounting regime, a …rm may have unfavorable realized cost but favorable reported cost. There are thus six di¤erent scenarios under each regime, resulting in six di¤erent levels of production quantity and …rm pro…t.
The …rms' production quantities and pro…ts under the three di¤erent accounting regimes are summarized below.
A.1 Unbiased accounting regime
A. 
A.3 Aggressive accounting regime 
B Proof of Proposition 1
Based on Appendix A, …rm i's expected pro…ts under the three di¤erent accounting regimes are calculated below.
Unbiased regime:
Conservative regime:
2(a c g )
Aggressive regime:
2 (a c b ) Thus we know the level of consumer surplus under the unbiased accounting regime is always lower than that under the conservative or aggressive accounting regime. The total social welfare is simply the sum of two investors'payo¤s (…rm pro…t net of investment I) and consumer surplus. Compared to the unbiased accounting regime, the increase in consumer surplus is not as high as the decrease in investment payo¤ under the conservative or aggressive accounting regime. Therefore the total social welfare is lower under the conservative or aggressive accounting regime than under the unbiased accounting regime.
D Proof of Proposition 3
First, we compare the expected …rm pro…ts under the conservative accounting regime and the unbiased regime. The expected …rm pro…t under the unbiased accounting regime is Taking the di¤erence between these two expected pro…ts, we have 
G Proof of Proposition 6
When both …rms report high costs, the following subgame describes the investors' potential divestment decisions and the corresponding payo¤s. unbiased and aggressive regimes; y conservative regime Suppose there is a random public signal that has two outcomes, fA; Bg, each with a 1 2 probability of occurrence. Suppose, too, investor i agrees to terminate her project when A occurs and not when B occurs, and investor j agrees to terminate when B occurs and not when A occurs. Neither investor has incentive to deviate from this strategy, as it is the best response to each other. Clearly, the resulted investment payo¤ is under the conservative accounting regime.
